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Abstract
The study aimed to explore the strategies used by Costa Rican primary school students when comparing 
urn probabilities. The sample was intentional and consisted of 55 6th graders. Using an interpretive 
approach, we analyzed the children’s responses to a questionnaire of five probability comparison items 
taken from previous studies, including different levels of proportional reasoning. Results indicate that 
problems in the first levels of proportional reasoning were solved easily by students, while problems 
at higher levels increased in difficulty. One-variable strategies, which compare only the favorable or 
unfavorable cases in both urns, are predominant; although there are correspondence strategies, few 
students show complete proportional reasoning. Aside from slight variations, results are similar to 
previous studies, which suggests that this task is influenced more by the child’s level of maturity than by 
the instruction received.
Keywords: Probability comparison; proportional reasoning; primary education; statistical education; 
urns; Costa Rica. 
Resumen
El objetivo del estudio fue explorar las estrategias que emplean niños y niñas de 6º curso de educación 
primaria costarricenses al comparar probabilidades en contextos de urnas. La muestra participante 
fue intencional y estuvo formada por 55 estudiantes de primaria. La investigación tiene un enfoque 
interpretativo, donde se analizan sus respuestas a un cuestionario formado por cinco ítems de comparación 
de probabilidades, tomados de investigaciones previas, que tienen en cuenta diferentes niveles de 
razonamiento proporcional. Los resultados indican que el estudiantado de la muestra resuelve con facilidad 
los problemas que corresponden a los primeros niveles de razonamiento proporcional, y aumentan su 
dificultad en los niveles superiores. Predominan las estrategias de una variable, en que se comparan solo 
los casos favorables o desfavorables de las dos urnas, y aunque aparecen estrategias de correspondencia, 
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es poca la cantidad de estudiantes que muestran un razonamiento proporcional completo. Los resultados 
son similares, con ligeras variaciones, a los estudios previos, lo que indica que en esta tarea influye más la 
maduración del alumnado que la enseñanza recibida.
Palabras clave: Comparación de probabilidades; Razonamiento proporcional; Educación primaria; 
Educación Estadística; Urnas; Costa Rica.
Resumo
O estudo teve como objetivo explorar as estratégias aplicadas por estudantes do 6º ano do ensino 
fundamental costarriquenho ao comparar probabilidades no contexto das urnas. A amostragem 
participativa foi intencional e composta por 55 meninos e meninas do ensino fundamental. A pesquisa 
tem uma abordagem interpretativa, em que são analisadas as respostas desse público em um questionário 
conformado por cinco itens de comparação de probabilidades, coletados de pesquisas prévias que levam 
em consideração diferentes níveis de raciocínio proporcional. Os resultados indicam que os estudantes 
da amostra solucionam facilmente problemas que correspondem aos primeiros níveis de raciocínio 
proporcional, e aumentam a dificuldade em níveis superiores. São predominantes as estratégias de uma 
variável, nos quais são comparados somente os casos favoráveis ou desfavoráveis das duas urnas e, ainda 
que aparecem estratégias de correspondência, é pouca a quantidade de estudantes que demonstram 
um raciocínio proporcional completo. Os resultados são semelhantes, com ligeiras variações, aos estudos 
prévios, indicando que nesta tarefa a maturidade da infância influencia mais do que o ensino recebido.
Palavras-chave: comparação de probabilidades; raciocínio proporcional; ensino fundamental; educação 
estatística; urnas; Costa Rica.
INTRODUCTION
At present, the teaching of probabil-
ity acquires great relevance as being nec-
essary to develop a probabilistic culture 
in citizens (Batanero, 2006; Gal, 2005). In 
addition to being a relevant part of math-
ematics and applicable to other curricular 
topics, probability is necessary today in 
many fields of science, where it allows de-
scribing the laws governing random phe-
nomena (Borovcnik, 2011).
An important and recognized con-
sequence of the above is the inclusion of 
probability content in the primary educa-
tion curricula in countries such as Spain 
(Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y De-
portes, 2014) or the United States (Nation-
al Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 
2000). In Costa Rican schools, current 
mathematics programs grant greater value 
to statistics and probability (MEP, 2012). 
Specifically, the following expectations are 
indicated about what students must learn 
throughout primary education in relation to 
probability (MEP, 2012):
• First cycle (Primer ciclo) (1rst to 3rd 
school year/grade): Identify random 
and deterministic situations within 
daily life and associated events. Clas-
sify random events as more or less 
probable for particular situations or 
experiments. Identify events accord-
ing to the simple results associated 
with them (p. 147).
• Second cycle (Segundo ciclo) (4th to 
6th school year/grade): Identify more 
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probable, less probable or equal-
ly probable events according to the 
number of simple results belonging 
to each event. Determine elemental 
probabilities associated with particu-
lar events. Pose and solve problems 
related to random situations (p. 247).
It is important, then, to analyze wheth-
er children have the necessary skills to suc-
cessfully address such content, as well as 
their possible difficulties, so that educators 
can take them into account in their educa-
tional planning. Until now, no investigation 
has been carried out on the probabilistic 
reasoning of Costa Rican pupils of this age 
range, and although the existence of previ-
ous studies in other countries is document-
ed, these were done with students without 
instruction in this subject matter. This takes 
great relevance in the current curricular im-
plementation context, where specifically, 
probability content is given a great deal of 
weight within primary education. Thus, we 
consider that the present work can provide 
initial information regarding the personal 
meaning that Costa Rican children assign to 
the probabilistic concepts developed since 
the approval of the current curriculum.
Consequently, the objective of this 
exploratory study is to provide information 
on the strategies that children apply when 
comparing probabilities in two urns and 
the difficulty that this task has for this age 
group depending on the level of proportion-
al reasoning required. We focus on students 
in the 6th grade of primary education (ages 
11-12 years) as this is the school year where 
primary education ends. Furthermore, the 
participating students have followed the 
current mathematics curriculum, which was 
fully applied to all primary education levels 
as of 2015. A second objective is to compare 
our results with those of previous research 
on the subject matter.
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
Our work is based mainly on the stud-
ies of Piaget and Inhelder (1951) on the 
comparison of probabilities. Piaget (1975) 
describes the process of childhood learning 
through action and assimilation-accommo-
dation. When children face a mathematical 
problem, they try to solve it (action) using 
the knowledge they already possess, us-
ing existing conceptual schemes that allow 
them to anticipate and use strategies and 
representations that they already know. If 
the child is unable to resolve the problem, a 
cognitive conflict is presented that he or she 
addresses through the processes of assim-
ilation and accommodation. Assimilation 
consists of the incorporation (acceptance), 
by the subject, of new data or ideas, and 
accommodation is the change or restructur-
ing of existing ones. The aforementioned 
authors suggest that knowledge progresses 
in stages of development that have an es-
tablished order, although the precise age at 
which a specific stage is reached may vary. 
Piaget (1975) also indicated that the sub-
jects who are in the same stage experience 
similar reasoning.
To study the ability and reasoning of 
children when comparing simple probabili-
ties, Piaget and Inhelder (1951) conceived 
an experimental game employing white to-
kens, marked or not with a cross, of which 
they introduced a small number into trans-
parent urns (boxes). Children were then 
asked to select between two urns the one 
from which they considered more likely to 
draw a marked token. The authors then con-
tinuously changed the number of marked 
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(favorable event) and unmarked (white) to-
kens (unfavorable event) in both urns and 
conducted interviews with students whose 
age ranged from 3.5 to 13-14 years. By 
comparing similar responses among same-
age groups, they obtained a description of 
three stages in the development of their 
reasoning pertaining to these types of situa-
tional problems.
The first stage (I) is subdivided into 
two levels. Level IA is characterized as 
comprised of an age group where children 
lack the logical schemes that allow them 
to understand: a) the inclusion of the part 
to whole; b) the disjunction between two 
types of elements; and c) the conservation 
of quantities (for example, when both types 
of tokens are selected and separated from 
each other). For this reason, Level IA chil-
dren are only capable of solving comparison 
problems involving two probabilities such 
as double impossibility (all tokens in both 
urns are white), double certainty (all tokens 
are marked) or certainty-impossibility (one 
urn containing white tokens only while the 
other urn only marked tokens). This is ex-
plained by acknowledging that these chil-
dren only compare favorable events without 
taking into account all possible events. At 
level IB, only one type of token is compared 
(favorable or unfavorable), and children are 
yet incapable of conceiving favorable events 
as part of all possible events (comparison of 
the part to whole); neither are they able to 
compare favorable to unfavorable events 
(part-part comparison). However, level IB 
children begin to understand that the prob-
ability depends on the number of favorable 
or unfavorable events.
The second stage (II) is also divided 
into two sublevels. At level IIA, children 
can solve probability comparison problems 
that involve only one variable, that is, when 
only favorable or unfavorable events need 
to be compared. They use additive compar-
isons, for example, subtracting the number 
of favorable from unfavorable events, or 
vice versa, in each urn and comparing the 
differences. They commence to understand 
the disjunction (each event is favorable or 
unfavorable), but provide wrong solutions 
in cases in which the composition of favor-
able and unfavorable events in both urns 
is proportional, since at this age they have 
not acquired the idea of fraction or propor-
tion. At level IIB children begin to solve the 
problem when the composition in the urns 
is proportional. To do this, they establish a 
correspondence between the favorable and 
unfavorable events resulting from one of 
the urns (for example, there are two favor-
able events for each unfavorable one) and 
compare it with the existing correspondence 
in the other urn.
In stage III, children are able to easily 
solve the proportionality case and manage 
to think of a general solution, if the num-
ber of favorable and unfavorable events is 
small and the ratio between them is simple, 
for example, double, triple, etc. A solution is 
generalized with advancement of age upon 
acquiring sufficient knowledge of fractions.
In the previous exposition it is ob-
served that success in comparing proba-
bilities, in the general case, supposes an 
adequate proportional reasoning, whose 
developmental stages have been analyzed 
in several studies (e.g, Karplus, Pulos and 
Stage, 1983; Noelting, 1980a; 1980b) and 
summarized by Behr, Harel, Post, and Lesh 
(1992) and Ben-Chaim, Keret, and Ilany 
(2012). The most relevant reference work 
for our study is that of Noelting (1980a; 
1980b), who based on a problem of compar-
ing two mixtures (water and orange juice), 
analyzed the stages initially proposed by 
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Piaget and Inhelder (1951) for comparison 
of probabilities and extends them to prob-
lems of proportionality. Concluding from 
his work, Noelting considers an initial stage 
(occurring at 2 years of age) in which the 
elements of the fraction are identified; and 
also, further subdivides some of the stages 
described by Piaget and Inhelder (1951):
• The intuitive stage is subdivided into 
three levels: lower (IA), middle (IB) 
and higher (IC), according to the terms 
of the fraction being compared (first 
term; second term with the same first 
term; or an internal relationship is es-
tablished between terms, either from 
one fraction with the other fraction or 
between fractions, respectively).
• The concrete operational stage is sub-
divided into two levels, according to 
the equivalence class of the fractions 
being compared, whether of ratio 
1 (stage IIA) or any other class of 
equivalence (stage IIB).
• The formal operational stage is subdi-
vided into two levels, according to the 
proportionality between the terms of 
the fraction. The lower level is deter-
mined when the terms are multiples 
(IIIA) and the higher level in cases 
where a ratio exists (IIIB).
Another work that will be considered 
is that of Pérez Echeverría, Carretero and 
Pozo (1986), who adapted the tasks of No-
elting (1980a; 1980b) and applied them to 
20 students of basic general education (13 
years old) and 20 high school students (16 
years old). They defined different levels of 
difficulty in the problems, according to the 
required strategy:
• Level 1: problems where the num-
ber of favorable events or unfavor-
able events, in both urns, is the same; 
therefore, the use of fractions is un-
necessary to solve the problem.
• Level 2: problems where proportion-
ality between favorable and unfavor-
able events in the same urn or between 
favorable and unfavorable events in 
both urns exist. They can be solved 
by establishing a correspondence in 
one urn and observing that the rela-
tionship is the same in the other urn.
• Level 3: problems that present pro-
portionality only between favorable 
events in both sets (or urns in our case) 
or only between unfavorable events, 
or between favorable and unfavorable 
events within a single set. Once the ra-
tio between favorable or unfavorable 
events has been established, it can be 
compared with the ratio existing be-
tween other terms and determined if 
the value is lower or higher.
• Level 4: problems without propor-
tionality relationships among the four 
members (favorable and unfavorable 
events in each set). It requires operat-
ing with fractions, converting them to 
a common denominator.
Background
Piaget and Inhelder’s (1951) research 
inspired a series of works on probabilistic 
reasoning in children which are described in 
detail in Jones, Langrall and Mooney (2007) 
and Langrall and Mooney (2005). Next, we 
summarize those most relevant to our study.
Falk, Falk and Levin (1980) present-
ed children between the ages of 4 and 11 
with the task of comparing probabilities 
by varying the number of favorable and 
possible events, under two contexts: urns 
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and roulettes. They considered nine types 
of tasks, taking into account the follow-
ing variables: a) the number of favorable 
events is less, greater or equal in the set 
with the highest probability; b) the num-
ber of favorable events is less, greater or 
equal in the set with the lowest probabil-
ity; c) both sets are equiprobable and the 
number of favorable events is less, greater 
or equal in a set. A systematic error was to 
always choose the set with the most favor-
able events.
Truran (1994) conducted an investi-
gation with 32 students between the ages 
of 8 and 15 also comparing the probability 
in urns. His results identify new strategies 
that expand those described in the research 
by Piaget and Inhelder (1951), such as the 
description of the urn’s content without 
making a selection, giving a correct answer 
without justification, preference for the 
smallest number of the total of tokens, com-
parison with known simple proportions and 
comparison between ratios of favorable and 
unfavorable possibilities.
The most relevant study on the sub-
ject was carried out by Green (1982), who 
made an evaluation of probabilistic reason-
ing in English children aged 11 to 16 years 
with a test that reproduced, with paper and 
pencil, the experiments of Piaget and Inhel-
der (1951). Some items proposed the com-
parison of probabilities in urn contexts, in 
which they found the following strategies: 
a) choose the urn with the greatest number 
of possible events; b) choose the urn with 
the greatest number of favorable events; c) 
choose the urn that provides the greatest dif-
ference between favorable and unfavorable 
events; d) choose the urn with the highest 
proportion between favorable and unfavor-
able events.
Cañizares (1997) undertook a study 
with 320 Spanish students aged 10 to 14, 
and among other problems, proposes those 
of comparing probabilities in the context 
of urns. Cañizares and Batanero (1997) in 
a study with 134 students aged 10 to 14 
considered tasks corresponding to levels 
I to IIIB described by Noelting (1980a; 
1980b). They registered the strategies used 
by children, classifying them into one- and 
two-variable strategies. One-variable strat-
egies are those in which only favorable, 
unfavorable or possible events are com-
pared; two-variable strategies are at hand 
when favorable and possible events are 
compared in an additive or multiplicative 
manner. Cañizares (1997) deduces that the 
most frequent levels of reasoning in sam-
pled students belong to IB through IIB, with 
few reaching IIIB. Some variables that in-
fluence the response are the composition of 
the urns (number of favorable and possible 
events) and the existence of possible biases 
in the context (for example, beliefs about 
equiprobability).
METHODOLOGY
The approach of the investigation is 
interpretive, since it focuses on understand-
ing educational phenomena (in our case the 
probabilistic reasoning in children) through 
the analysis of quantitative and qualita-
tive elements reflected in the responses to 
a questionnaire (Cerrón, 2019; Gil, León, 
and Morales, 2017). The research work is 
exploratory, since the sample is intention-
al and moderate in size; and according to 
Bisquerra (1989), it conforms to applied 
research, since it seeks to use the theory de-
veloped by other investigations (Cañizares, 
1997; Fischbein and Gazit, 1984; Green, 
1982) in the context of Costa Rica, in order 
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to provide knowledge to guide the teaching 
and learning of probability at the primary 
education level.
The sample used was non-random 
(with intentional selection) and consisted 
of 55 children in the 6th grade of primary 
school with the following characteristics: 
40 children were 11 years old and 15 were 
12 years of age; 29 were studying in a pri-
vate institution and 26 in a public institution 
located in the province of Cartago, Costa 
Rica. The mathematics teachers indicated 
that the pupils received statistics and prob-
ability education since 2016 in accordance 
with MEP’s (2012) study programs. The 
treatment of the subjects was based on the 
official textbook, and there is shortage of 
evidence suggesting activities being carried 
out using physical experimentation.
A questionnaire was designed (An-
nex), based on some items employed in 
Green’s (1982) research, which Cañizares 
(1997) also used. It is intended to use items 
taken from validated questionnaires and 
to compare the probabilistic reasoning of 
Costa Rican pupils with that of students at a 
similar educational level in other countries. 
Green (1982) first conducted a study of the 
validity of the content of his questionnaire, 
with the help of the validation carried out 
by expert teams and analysis of included 
items. He also analyzed the reliability of 
the instrument using Cronbach’s alpha co-
efficient (α), for which he obtained a value 
of α=0.88.
Cañizares (1997) performed a factori-
al analysis of the responses of the sampled 
population to Green’s questionnaire, and 
achieved a total of 15 factors. Therefore, she 
calculated Carmines’ theta reliability coeffi-
cient (θ), which is preferable to Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient (α) when factorial analysis 
data, as in her case, show a multidimensional 
structure; her result was θ=0.8242. All items 
propose the use of urn experiments employ-
ing black and white tokens, and request is 
made for selecting one of two given urns 
wherein the event “to draw a black token” 
is more likely; the composition of the urns 
is different among items.
Item 1 corresponds to the lower in-
tuitive level (IA) described by Noelting 
(1980a; 1980b), because both urns contain 
the same number of unfavorable events and 
an unequal number of favorable events. 
Item 2 accommodates equality of favorable 
events and inequality of unfavorable events, 
thus corresponding to the middle intuitive 
level (IB). Therefore, in these two items it 
is unnecessary to use the four data of the 
statement, as it suffices to compare or to 
know the number of favorable (item 1) or 
unfavorable (item 2) events. Both items 
correspond to the first level of difficulty de-
scribed by Pérez Echeverría et al. (1986) as 
they do not require proportional reasoning.
In items 3 to 5, the number of favor-
able events is a multiple of the number of 
unfavorable ones. In item 3 (lower concrete 
operational level (IIA), according to Noelt-
ing 1980a; 1980b), the number of favorable 
and unfavorable events is the same in both 
urns; in item 5 (higher concrete operational 
level (IIB)), the ratio between favorable and 
unfavorable events present in both urns is 3; 
and in item 4 (lower formal operational level 
(IIIA)), the ratio in one urn is 3 while in the 
other is 2. In these last three items it is nec-
essary to use the four data of the statement 
as well as proportional reasoning to estab-
lish a ratio in one of the urns and compare 
it with the other. Items 3 and 5 are assigned 
difficulty level 2 as per Pérez Echeverría et 
al. (1986) classification, since proportionali-
ty exists between favorable and unfavorable 
events in each urn or between favorable and 
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obtained with students of the same age in 
previous investigations: Cañizares (1997) in 
Spain and Green (1982) in the United King-
dom. These are simple probability compar-
ison items in the context of urns, where the 
only variable is urn composition.  
Items 1 and 2 were relatively straight-
forward for the study subjects, as more than 
two-thirds of pupils performed the task cor-
rectly. These items are of difficulty level 1 
as per Pérez Echeverria et al. (1986) and 
are assigned levels IA (item 1) and IB (item 
2) according to Noelting’s (1980a; 1980b). 
These items can be solved correctly just by 
comparing the favorable or unfavorable cas-
es (one-variable strategies). It can be stated 
that most of the study subjects have reached 
these first levels of reasoning.
Item 4, corresponding to proportion-
al reasoning level IIIA (Noelting, 1980a; 
1980b) and difficulty level 3, according to 
Pérez Echeverría et al. (1986), exhibited 
moderate difficulty as only half of the stu-
dents (50.9%) solved it correctly, thus only 
half the pupils reached this level of reason-
ing. The items with the greatest level of dif-
ficulty (difficulty level 2, according to Pérez 
Echeverría et al. (1986)) were 3 and 5; the 
latter item (level IIB, according to Noelting 
1980a; 1980b) was only answered correctly 
by 16.4% of the students.
There is an inversion in the expect-
ed difficulty in item 5, which theoretically 
should be easier than item 4 as expected 
from the classification promoted by Pérez 
Echeverría et al. (1986) (Table 1); howev-
er, experimental results demonstrate oth-
erwise. We believe that for children it has 
been easier to compare the equality between 
favorable (item 2) and unfavorable (item 1) 
events. The comparison of two similar ratios 
(3/1 and 6/2, item 5) has been made difficult 
by the fact that the set has also taken into 
Table.2. Percentage of correct answers in the present work compared to those obtained by 
Cañizares (1997) and Green (1982) for 6th grade students (ages 11-12 years).
Item Nº Costa Rica (Present study) Spain 
(Cañizares, 1997)
United Kingdom (Green, 
1982)
1 83.6 70.3 88.0
2 72.7 67.6 55.0
3 41.8 54.1 43.0
4 50.9 27.0 38.0
5 16.4 - 20.0
unfavorable events in both urns. Item 4 is 
classified in level 3 because there is a sim-
ple relationship in the first urn (3 favorable 
events for each unfavorable event) which 
can be compared to the relation existing in 
the second urn (two to one). One difference 
in our study, compared to those of Green 
(1982) and Cañizares (1997) is that we pro-
vided the graphical representation of the 
urns in items 4 and 5, which was not given 
in the referenced studies.
Table 1 summarizes the classification 
of items according to the level of propor-
tional reasoning required for their resolution 
as established by Noelting (1980a; 1980b), 
and their level of difficulty according to 
Pérez Echeverría et al. (1986). It also pres-
ents the composition of the two compared 
urns, (a1, b1) and (a2, b2), with “a” and “b” 
being the favorable and unfavorable events, 
respectively, in the proposed experiments of 
items 1 through 4.  
Table.1. Stages of proportional reasoning (Noelting, 1980a; 1980b) and corresponding 
level of difficulty (Pérez Echeverría et al., 1986) required per item.
Stage Proportional reasoning level Item Composition
(a1,b1) vs (a2,b2)
Difficulty level
IA Lower intuitive 1 (3,1) vs (2,1) 1
IB Middle intuitive 2 (5,2) vs (5,3) 1
IIA Lower concrete operational 3 (2,2) vs (4,4) 2
IIB Higher concrete operational 5 (3,1) vs (6,2) 2
IIIA Lower formal operational 4 (12,4) vs (20,10) 3
We consider that Table 1 will help us 
analyze the strategies employed by chil-
dren, confronting them with what is expect-
ed from a problem of comparison of frac-
tions of the same level of difficulty (Pérez 
Echeverría et al., 1986) in Noelting’s cate-
gorization (1980a; 1980b).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Questionnaire responses were pooled 
and analyzed through a content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2013), which allows us to 
establish categories that emerge objectively 
as a result of the systematic analysis per-
formed. This analysis is complemented with 
numerical information in tables indicating 
the percentage of correct answers and per-
centages of each strategy in each item.
Table 2 exhibits the percentages of 
correct answers obtained in the items of the 
questionnaire; it also considers the results 
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obtained with students of the same age in 
previous investigations: Cañizares (1997) in 
Spain and Green (1982) in the United King-
dom. These are simple probability compar-
ison items in the context of urns, where the 
only variable is urn composition.  
Items 1 and 2 were relatively straight-
forward for the study subjects, as more than 
two-thirds of pupils performed the task cor-
rectly. These items are of difficulty level 1 
as per Pérez Echeverria et al. (1986) and 
are assigned levels IA (item 1) and IB (item 
2) according to Noelting’s (1980a; 1980b). 
These items can be solved correctly just by 
comparing the favorable or unfavorable cas-
es (one-variable strategies). It can be stated 
that most of the study subjects have reached 
these first levels of reasoning.
Item 4, corresponding to proportion-
al reasoning level IIIA (Noelting, 1980a; 
1980b) and difficulty level 3, according to 
Pérez Echeverría et al. (1986), exhibited 
moderate difficulty as only half of the stu-
dents (50.9%) solved it correctly, thus only 
half the pupils reached this level of reason-
ing. The items with the greatest level of dif-
ficulty (difficulty level 2, according to Pérez 
Echeverría et al. (1986)) were 3 and 5; the 
latter item (level IIB, according to Noelting 
1980a; 1980b) was only answered correctly 
by 16.4% of the students.
There is an inversion in the expect-
ed difficulty in item 5, which theoretically 
should be easier than item 4 as expected 
from the classification promoted by Pérez 
Echeverría et al. (1986) (Table 1); howev-
er, experimental results demonstrate oth-
erwise. We believe that for children it has 
been easier to compare the equality between 
favorable (item 2) and unfavorable (item 1) 
events. The comparison of two similar ratios 
(3/1 and 6/2, item 5) has been made difficult 
by the fact that the set has also taken into 
Table.2. Percentage of correct answers in the present work compared to those obtained by 
Cañizares (1997) and Green (1982) for 6th grade students (ages 11-12 years).
Item Nº Costa Rica (Present study) Spain 
(Cañizares, 1997)
United Kingdom (Green, 
1982)
1 83.6 70.3 88.0
2 72.7 67.6 55.0
3 41.8 54.1 43.0
4 50.9 27.0 38.0
5 16.4 - 20.0
account the number of favorable events, 
which is greater in the second urn. When 
compared to results from previous studies, 
the level of difficulty of each item was sim-
ilar, although our results in items 1, 2 and 4 
were slightly better than those obtained by 
Cañizares (1997) and markedly better than 
those reported by Green (1982) for items 2 
and 4. Item 3 results were worse than those 
of Cañizares (1997) but similar to Green’s 
(1982); item 5 was found very difficult, also 
in the previous research.
Student strategies
From the analysis of the students’ ar-
guments when justifying their answers, res-
olution strategies were classified based on 
the classification established by Cañizares 
and Batanero (1997). These strategies were 
as follows:
A. Comparison of possible events. 
Although circumstantially correct answers 
could be generated, it lacks a logical ba-
sis and originates from the impossibility 
of comparing the total set with a subset 
(part-whole). 
E38: “There are more tokens than in E” 
(answer B, item 3).
B. Comparison of favorable events. 
Selecting the urn with the greatest favorable 
events. Correct answers are generated when 
there is equality of unfavorable events, as 
in item 1. 
E8: “Because there are more black balls 
in A than in B” (answer A, item 1).
C. Comparison of unfavorable events. 
Selecting the urn with the fewest unfavor-
able events. It represents an advance with 
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respect to strategy B, as it is recognized that 
the number of unfavorable events diminish-
es the probability of winning. Correct an-
swers are generated when there is equality 
of favorable events, as in item 2.
E54: “Because there is one less white token 
than in the other urn” (answer A, item 2).
Although there is preference for the 
previous one-variable strategies, typical of 
the preoperational stage, other two-variable 
strategies were used.
D. Additive comparison of favorable 
and unfavorable events. It consists in compar-
ing the difference between favorable and un-
favorable events in both urns. In the example 
that follows, the difference would be zero.
E16: “Because both urns contain the 
same amount of white and black tokens” 
(answer C, item 3).
E. Correspondence. A criterion of pro-
portionality is established in one fraction to 
be applied in the other. This type of reasoning 
is typical of a higher level of development 
and, according to Piaget and Inhelder (1951), 
is associated with the formal operational pe-
riod, although it could also appear during the 
concrete operational period in simpler cases 
of proportional composition of tokens be-
tween urns. Some examples are:
E7: “The same possibility because if we 
double Ex2, the same result as F is ob-
tained” (answer C, item 3).
E14: “Because urn E contains the same 
number of black tokens as white tokens 
and the same for urn F” (answer C, item 3).
In the previously cited examples it is 
appreciated how pupils establish a criterion 
of proportionality in one of the urns in order 
to apply it to the other; this is natural when 
the individual still lacks the knowledge to per-
form calculations using fractions. According 
to Noelting (1980a; 1980b), this type of strat-
egy is associated with stage IIA, where chil-
dren internally relate the terms of the fraction, 
differentiating the concepts of ratio and quan-
tity. The author makes the distinction between 
“within”- and “between”- type strategies to 
compare two fractions (a1/b1 vs a2/b2), so it is 
important to identify that E7 performs a “be-
tween” strategy, when comparing the terms 
of one fraction with those of another (a1 with 
a2 and b1 with b2), while E14 uses a “within” 
strategy, because the individual compares the 
terms within the same fraction to establish a 
ratio (a1/b1=1/1) and then compares it with the 
ratio in the other fraction (a2/b2 = 1/1).
F. Multiplicative (ratio comparison). 
The number of favorable events is related 
to the number of possible events, that is, the 
part to whole, or also fractions formed by 
the number of favorable and unfavorable 
events, to later compare them by applying 
Laplace’s rule. Few individuals in the study 
group use multiplicative strategies, which 
are undoubtedly the most elaborate and re-
quire mastery of calculation with fractions:
E14: “Because urn J has a third as many 
white tokens as there are black tokens and 
the same for urn K” (answer A, item 5).
E17: “Because urn H has half as many 
white tokens as there are black tokens 
and urn G has one third as many white 
tokens as there are black tokens” (an-
swer B, item 4).
It can be seen that E14 establishes 1/3 as 
the fraction of white (unfavorable events) to 
black (favorable events) tokens and compares 
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this value to that in the other urn. E17, in item 
4, performs a comparison of fractions and re-
lies on the graphical representation shown in 
Figure 1, setting favorable and unfavorable 
events to establish more clearly a “within” 
comparison through a “part-part” relation.
Figure 1. Graphic representation drawn by 
E17 in item 4. 
Source: present investigation.
G. Equiprobability bias. When all 
the events of a random experiment are 
considered as equiprobable it is known as 
“equiprobability bias” (Lecoutre, 1992).
E27: “Because both urns have the same 
probability of drawing a white token or 
a black token” (answer C, item 1).
E30: “Any token can be drawn” (answer 
C, in items 1, 2 and 3).
H. Disposition of tokens. There is 
a notable percentage of arguments asso-
ciated with beliefs that relate the spatial 
arrangement of the tokens in the item’s 
graphic representation with the probability 
of the event; also identified in Cañizares and 
Batanero (1997). This occurred in all items 
for different students:
E52: “It has the black token on all 8 
sides” (answer A, item 1).
E39: “Because the black token is also at 
the top” (answer B, item 3).
E48: “Because the black ball is first and 
the black ball is much more likely to 
come out” (answer C, item 5).
I. Other. These strategies arise when 
individuals express arguments such as attri-
bution to luck or the manner in which the 
token is drawn from the urn, as registered in 
the following example:
E32: “But the white token can also be 
drawn, since it all depends on how you 
hold your hand” (answer A, item 1).  
Table 3 summarizes the strategies 
involved in the different items. In item 1, 
just over three-quarters of the individuals 
made justifications associated with relevant 
Table 3. Percentage distribution of adopted strategies per item (the correct strategies have 
been underlined).
Strategy Items
1 2 3 4 5
A. Comparison of possible events 3.6 1.8 20.0 12.7 10.9
B. Comparison of favorable events 72.7 21.8 12.7 23.6 32.7
C. Comparison of unfavorable events 5.5 41.8 5.5 10.9 12.7
D. Additive comparison of favorable and unfavorable events 5.5 16.4 32.7 29.1 23.6
E. Correspondence 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.6 7.3
F. Multiplicative (ratio comparison) 1.8 1.8 3.6 1.8 1.8
G. Equiprobability bias 3.6 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.0
H. Disposition of tokens 1.8 10.9 7.3 10.9 7.3
I. Others 5.5 3.6 10.9 7.3 3.6
No response 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0
Source: present investigation.










 Vol. 35, N
°. 2, pp. 1-18. July-D
ecem








When analyzing the responses of chil-
dren in the sample regarding the comparison 
of probabilities in the context of urns, we ob-
tained similar results to those of other previ-
ous investigations involving children of the 
same age and carried out in a historical peri-
od where elementary probability content was 
absent from school curricula. It is true that, 
at the time of applying the questionnaire, our 
subject group had not yet received the prob-
ability content of their 6th grade course, only 
the probability curricula from previous school 
grades. Although they had not studied the 
quantification of probabilities using Laplace’s 
rule, this is not binding with the success in the 
items proposed in the questionnaire, since the 
use of such tool (Laplace’s rule) is not nec-
essary to establish the comparison of the re-
quested probabilities, as was the case in pre-
vious reported investigations with students 
of the same age. On the other hand, students 
were not accustomed to comparing two differ-
ent experiments as demanded by the proposed 
tasks, since they had previously only worked 
on events from the same experiment. There-
fore, it would be important to expand our 
study to include a 7th grade group, to ensure 
that they have performed similar probability 
comparison tasks and thus analyze the effect 
of the instruction.
However, our conjecture is that the great-
er difficulty of some items is due to the fact 
that only part of the individuals has reached the 
corresponding level of proportional reasoning 
in Noelting’s classification (1980a; 1980b). 
In the 5th grade, Costa Rican children study 
proper and improper, homogeneous and het-
erogeneous fractions, and carry out activities 
to compare fractions, however, the context of 
probability is often not used to complete their 
study of fractions and make comparisons.
strategies, with strategy B being the most 
widely used (72.7%) due to the equality of 
unfavorable events. In Cañizares and Ba-
tanero (1997), approximately two thirds of 
same-age individuals used pertinent argu-
ments and comparison of favorable events 
was also the most adopted strategy (48.6%), 
but higher in percentage of two-variable 
strategies (10.8%).
In item 2, 60% of students used per-
tinent strategies, where C was the most 
used (41.8%), which is natural due to the 
existence of the same number of favorable 
events. Cañizares and Batanero (1997) ob-
tained a lower percentage of pertinent ar-
guments (54.0%) of which approximately 
40% compared the number of unfavorable 
events, as in our study.
For item 3, 38.1% of pertinent argu-
ments were obtained, a little lower than the 
48.6% obtained by Cañizares and Batanero 
(1997); and while our pupils focused on strate-
gy D (32.7%), those of Cañizares and Batane-
ro (1997) did so on E (43.2%), which requires 
a higher level of proportional reasoning.
In items 4 and 5, not even 10% of cor-
rect strategies were reached, and reasoning 
focused on one-variable strategies, in the 
comparison of favorable and unfavorable 
events, which is not appropriate, because the 
number of favorable or unfavorable events 
does not coincide. The same occurred with 
item 4 in Cañizares and Batanero (1997), 
where only 2.7% of pertinent strategies 
were obtained in children of the same age 
as in our study. It should be remembered 
that this item presents a higher level of pro-
portional reasoning, corresponding to stage 
IIIA (Noelting, 1980a; 1980b). The results 
from Item 5 are not related to Cañizares and 
Batanero (1997) because they used a differ-
ent item in their investigation.
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about probability. This recommendation 
follows the principle that knowledge is ac-
tively constructed by the individual and not 
passively received from the surroundings 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1951), hence the im-
portance of promoting the active teaching 
of children in the field of probability.
Our study is limited, due to the size 
of the sample and its intentional nature, so 
our purpose is to expand it in order to obtain 
more generalizable conclusions. However, 
despite these limitations, we believe that the 
information obtained can contribute to the 
training of educators involved in the teach-
ing of this subject.
As pointed out by Alpízar et al. (2012) 
and Alpízar, Chavarría and Oviedo (2015), 
a portion of primary school teachers man-
ifest insecurity when teaching probability 
either due to their weak didactic training in 
probability or complete lack of teaching ex-
perience on the topic. Therefore, we high-
light the value of the information gathered 
by the present investigation, and more so 
in the context of curricular implementation 
currently experienced in Costa Rica.
The benefits spanning from the present 
investigation are multiple: it will assist in the 
development of educator training processes 
and teaching courses, it supports reflection 
on the cognitive demands of the tasks im-
posed upon young-age pupils, their ways of 
reasoning, possible biases and how such ele-
ments can guide educational planning.
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Our recommendation, then, is to com-
plement the probability content taught in 
primary education with exercises similar 
to those disclosed in the items of the pres-
ent questionnaire, where, first, students 
should only be presented with one-variable 
problems requiring first level (items 1 and 
2) proportional reasoning. In addition, the 
study of fractions can be further comple-
mented with “part-part”-type comparisons, 
as currently “part-whole” comparisons pre-
dominate and, also with the application of 
proportionality to probability comparison 
situational problems.
Although Piaget and Inhelder (1951)
point out that children compare possible 
events at first (strategy A), this strategy did 
not appear frequently in our study. We agree 
with Cañizares and Batanero (1997) who 
point out that in problems where favorable 
events are explicitly distinguishable from 
unfavorable events, students first compare 
favorable events (strategy B) prior to pos-
sible events, as there is an initial “part-part” 
perception. This is evidenced in all the items 
of our questionnaire (except item 3), where 
the percentages of strategy B were higher 
than those of strategy A. The above finding 
is clearly reflected in item 1, where almost 
three quarters of the individuals selected 
strategy B which only generates correct an-
swers for this item.
It is important, however, that students 
move on to superior strategies in more elab-
orate problems. We think that this step is fa-
cilitated by exposing pupils to manipulative 
material, where they can recreate the situ-
ation presented, expose their initial beliefs 
and, with the help of the teachers, correct 
them through experience. According to 
Pratt (2000), there are many materials at our 
disposal that can serve as resources to sup-
port the construction of correct intuitions 
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Item 1a: 3 black tokens and 1 white token are placed inside urn A. Urn B contains 2 black 
tokens and 1 white token. (Look at the drawing):
If you have to draw a black token to win a prize, without looking inside the urn, which urn 
would you choose to draw from? Indicate the correct answer:
(A) Urn A provides a greater chance of drawing a black token.
(B) Urn B provides a greater chance of drawing a black token.
(C) Both urns provide the same possibility.
(D) I don’t know.
Item 1b: Why?
Item 2a: Two other urns have inside some black tokens and some white tokens (Look at the 
drawing):
• Urn C: 5 black and 2 white.
• Urn D: 5 black and 3 white.
From which urn (C or D) is it more likely to draw a black token? Or, on the contrary, do both 
give the same possibility?
(A) Urn C.
(B) Urn D.
(C) The same possibility.
(D) I don’t know.
Item 2b: Why?
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Item 3a: Two other different urns also have black and white tokens (Look at the drawing):
• Urn E: 2 black and 2 white.
• Urn F: 4 black and 4 white.
Which urn provides the best chance of drawing a black token?
(A) Urn E.
(B) Urn F.
(C) The same possibility.
(D) I don’t know.
Item 3b: Why?
Item 4a: Two other different urns have black and white tokens (Look at the drawing):
• Urn G: 12 black and 4 white.
• Urn H: 20 black and 10 white.
Which urn provides the best chance to draw a black token?
(A) The same possibility.
(B) Urn G.
(C) Urn H.
(D) I don’t know.
Item 4b: Why?
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Item 5a: Two other urns different from the above have black and white tokens (Look at the 
drawing):
• Urn J: 3 black and 1 white.
• Urn K: 6 black and 2 white.
Which urn provides the greater chance of drawing a black token?
(A The same possibility.
(B) Urn J.
(C) Urn K.
(D) I don’t know.
Item 5b: Why?
